IMMATURITY, NORMATIVE COMPETENCE, AND JUVENILE TRANSFER: HOW (NOT)
TO PUNISH MINORS FOR MAJOR CRIMES1
David O. Brink2

In response to perceived increases in violent youth crime, the last two decades have witnessed a
national trend toward getting tough on youth crime and holding youthful offenders more
accountable. A central element in this national trend is the transfer of juveniles to adult criminal
court, where the consequences of conviction are in various ways much more serious than they
are in juvenile court. Prosecutors have long had discretion to prosecute older, mature juveniles
who are repeat offenders as adults, and judges in juvenile court have long had the power to issue
waivers or transfers that reassign these kinds of juveniles to adult court after a hearing in juvenile
court. But in the attempt to get tough on violent juvenile crime, both the judicial waiver and
prosecutorial discretion have expanded with the result that more juveniles are being transferred
to adult court at younger ages for a broader variety of crimes. Many states have gone so far as
enacting legislation requiring mandatory transfer of juveniles to adult criminal court based on
age, offense, or both. For example, California (the state in which I reside) recently enacted
Proposition 21, which requires the transfer to adult criminal court of all juveniles over the age of
14 charged with certain serious criminal offenses, including murder and various sexual offenses.3
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Emblematic of the transfer trend is the notorious case of Lionel Tate. In Florida in 1999,
when he was 12 years old, Lionel Tate brutally killed 6 year old family friend Tiffany Eunick in
his home. Lionel alleged that he was imitating body slams and other tactics employed by
professional wrestlers that he watched on television.

Tiffany suffered a fractured skull, a

lacerated liver, and many other injuries from being kicked, punched, and thrown about the room
– injuries that proved fatal. The prosecutor decided to try Lionel as an adult, apparently in
response to the sensational nature of his crime. Lionel was offered a chance to plead to seconddegree murder and a reduced sentence, but his mother refused the plea bargain on the ground that
Lionel had not intended to kill Tiffany.4 Lionel was convicted of first-degree murder, which in
Florida carries a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.5 In
response to public outcry over Lionel’s sentence, he was recently granted a retrial and
subsequently accepted substantially the same plea bargain that he had earlier refused.6
Lionel’s brutal crime was shocking and tragic.

But even more shocking was his

prosecution and sentencing as an adult. 12 year-olds are immature cognitively and emotionally
in ways that render them not fully responsible, and to be sentenced to life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole at that age is to give up on someone as incorrigible before his character
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has even been formed. Permanent injustice was averted in Lionel’s case by virtue of his retrial
and subsequent plea agreement. This might be reassuring if Lionel’s first trial was aberrational.
Sadly, it is not. The national trend to try juveniles accused of serious crimes as adults is
unmistakable.
The transfer trend is deeply flawed. Juvenile crime deserves punishment, and serious
juvenile crime deserves serious punishment. Moreover, some juveniles – especially older, more
mature juveniles who are repeat offenders – may deserve to be tried and punished in adult
criminal court. But the trend to try ever younger juveniles as adults based solely on the gravity
of their crimes is deeply mistaken and terribly unjust.
One reason the trend is mistaken depends on a retributive conception of punishment,
according to which wrongdoers deserve punishment and should be punished in proportion to the
severity of their wrongdoing. But wrongdoing is a function not just of the harm one causes but
also of the culpability or responsibility one bears for the harm. For a variety of reasons,
juveniles tend to be less competent in discriminating right from wrong and in being able to
regulate successfully their actions in accord with these discriminations.

If they are less

competent, then they are less responsible. But then the trend to try juveniles as adults mistakenly
assesses the wrongs juveniles have done and the punishment they deserve by the harm they have
done, ignoring their diminished responsibility for this harm.
In ignoring the diminished responsibility that juveniles have for their crimes, the trend to
try juveniles as adults ignores a principal reason for having separate systems of juvenile and
adult criminal justice in the first place. It is in part because the normative competence of
juveniles is diminished that we think that juvenile crime should be conceived and punished
differently than adult crime and that juveniles should be tried and sentenced differently. This
rationale for juvenile justice is retributive.
Another rationale appeals to possibilities for rehabilitation or correction. For obvious
reasons, juveniles are more corrigible and educable than adults. But then the corrective functions
of punishment are better served by making different penal provisions for juveniles. Probation
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and community service tend to be more effective alternatives with juveniles than with adults.
Furthermore, there is a special case to be made in the case of many juveniles, where prison
sentences are necessary, that prison sentences should be shorter, that prison conditions should be
more humane, and that prison life should contain more opportunities for education and
vocational training. By mainstreaming juvenile with adult offenders and placing convicted
juveniles in adult prison facilities, the trend to try juveniles as adults ignores the corrective
rationale for a system of juvenile justice.
There are several dimensions to understanding and assessing the trend to try juveniles as
adults. Some are empirical – involving the social and legal history of juvenile justice, the social
determinants and consequences of the trend to try juveniles as adults, and various aspects of
developmental psychology. Other aspects of the problem are conceptual and jurisprudential –
involving the justification for punishment, the rationale for a separate system of juvenile justice,
and the bearing of these jurisprudential ideas on the proper response to juvenile crime. Any
sensible discussion of these issues must say something about both empirical and conceptual
issues, but it is possible to mix these dimensions in different ratios. Though I will have to say
something about the empirical background to and aspects of this trend, my focus will be on
conceptual issues of a jurisprudential sort. These are the issues that interest me most and that I
am best qualified to address.

1. JUVENILE JUSTICE BACKGROUND
The concept of a special system of juvenile justice is largely a twentieth century
development.7 Until the very late nineteenth century, Anglo-American law tended to treat
children either as property or as little adults. Under the age of five or six, children were regarded
7
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as the property of their parents, to be treated, like other property, at the discretion of the owner.
Once the child reached the age of five or six, the law generally regarded him as a legal person,
holding most of the responsibilities (and some of the rights) of adults.
Industrialization and urbanization in the nineteenth century and the emergence of
charitable organizations contributed to new ideas about the education and socialization of
children, in general, and wayward children, in particular. This led to the development of houses
of refuge and cottage reformatories that dealt with wayward children with a mix of discipline,
education, and vocational training. In the late nineteenth century jurisdictions in several states
experimented with separate procedures of some kind in the criminal trials of juveniles. The first
juvenile court was established in Cook County, Illinois in 1899. By the 1920s separate juvenile
justice systems were established in nearly every state.
These juvenile courts differed from their adult counterparts in several ways. These
differences reflected the assumptions that juveniles were not as mature as adults and that they
were therefore both less responsible for their offenses and more corrigible than their adult
counterparts.

Procedurally, the juvenile courts were more informal and less adversarial.

Substantively, they focused less on punishment and more on rehabilitation and socialization.
Pursuing a doctrine of parens patriae (common guardianship), juvenile courts adopted a more
paternalistic attitude toward juvenile offenders.8
offenders was different.

Consequently, the disposition of juvenile

Separate juvenile correctional facilities were created that stressed

educational and vocational training, sentences were often shorter, courts made greater use of
probationary and other diversionary alternatives to incarceration, and the criminal records of
juvenile offenders were not made a matter of public record in order to prevent stigmatization that
might interfere with successful rehabilitation.
For some time, the paternalistic focus of juvenile courts lent itself to procedural
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informalities in which juvenile offenders were not accorded the same procedural safeguards
before and during trial as their adult counterparts. This practice eventually led to due process
concerns, and by the 1960s the Supreme Court was willing to recognize due process rights in
juvenile proceedings. In Kent v. United States the Court insisted that in any judicial transfer
from juvenile to adult criminal court the accused is entitled to a hearing, the assistance of
counsel, and a statement of the reasons for the transfer.9 In the case of In re Gault the Court held
that juveniles enjoy the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Sixth
Amendment rights to notice of charges, to confront and cross-examine accusers, and to the
assistance of counsel.10 And in In re Winship the Court not only affirmed the requirement that
adult criminals be convicted only by the standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but also
extended this evidential requirement to juvenile proceedings in which incarceration is a possible
outcome.11
Contemporary juvenile jurisprudence distinguishes juveniles from adults and recognizes
distinct forms of juvenile offense. For instance, the Model Penal Code identifies juveniles as
those under 18. Though it requires juveniles under 16 to be tried in juvenile court, it provides for
the possibility of judicial waiver of juveniles between the ages of 16 and 18 to adult criminal
court on a case-by- case basis, in which the prosecution bears the burden of proof in justifying the
waiver.12 A substantial majority of states have followed the Model Penal Code in identifying
juveniles as those under 18.13 Juvenile courts recognize two main kinds of juvenile offense.
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Juvenile crime is simply criminal activity committed by a juvenile. The rules for adult and
juvenile crime are the same; the only difference is the age of the offender. By contrast, status
offenses comprise acts whose legality depends upon the status of the actor. Juvenile status
offenses involve acts that would be legal if performed by an adult but are illegal for juveniles,
such as truancy, running away from home, curfew violations, smoking, drinking, and swearing.
Of necessity, the trend of trying juveniles as adults applies only to juvenile criminal conduct, not
juvenile status offenses.

2. THE TRANSFER TREND
Most commentators view the trend to try juveniles as adults as part of a more general
attempt to “get tough” on crime and criminals over the last two decades. This crackdown on
violent crime is a response to perceived increases in violent crime, in general, and juvenile
violence, in particular. Juvenile crime is perceived by many as more violent and serious than
before, and more serious crime has seemed to many to call for more serious punishment. For
instance, Paul McNulty, president of an anti-crime advocacy group and former official in the
U.S. Department of Justice during the Bush administration, warns of a coming epidemic of
violent juvenile crime, calls for an end to paternalistic attitudes toward juvenile offenders, and
demands that juveniles be held more accountable for their crimes.
The challenge ... lies in suppressing juvenile crime at the first sign of trouble, often with
young teenagers or even pre-teens, before these criminals become violent young men.
Government’s role is to enforce the law, and it should be vigorous and purposeful in the
acceptance of that duty. When families fail to instill virtue in their children, government
must be prepared immediately to send a clear message to those children, and their
parents, that law-breaking will not be tolerated, and that children will be held
accountable. To do that will require a complete overhaul of the juvenile justice system.14
14
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On this view, responding to the epidemic of juvenile crime requires changing the juvenile justice
system so that it stresses accountability and is more punitive.
As is often true, the data appear to be less clear than the public perception. For instance,
in Juvenile Justice John Whitehead and Steven Lab chart a pattern of generally increasing
juvenile offense rates during the period 1960–1995, as measured by arrest rates.15 Except for
decreases in the early 1980s, the pattern they chart is one of increasing juvenile offense. But
when they turn to genuinely violent crime – murder and aggravated assault – they note
significant decreases in the incidence of arrest after the 1980s.16 A different picture of trends in
juvenile crime is presented by The Sentencing Project, a non-profit criminal justice policy
organization. In an analysis that tracked patterns in juvenile crime from 1970 through 1998, they
report that
The juvenile proportion of all arrests for serious violent crime in 1998 was about average
for the preceding twenty-five years, while the percentage of property crime arrests
involving juveniles has actually declined throughout most of this period.17
The exception to these patterns, they note, is murder. While juvenile murder rates remained
relatively constant from 1970 through 1985 at around 2000 per year, they underwent a steep
increase after that, peaking in 1993 at almost 4500, and then dropping by 48% by 1998. The
prime determinant of these murder rates was the number of murders with guns (the rate of nongun murders during this period was constant). A common explanation of this spike in the
juvenile murder rate during the late 1980s and early 1990s appeals to the explosion of crack
markets and the greater availability of guns in urban areas during this period.18 These two
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studies disagree in their assessments of general trends in juvenile crime and even violent juvenile
crime. They agree only in the patterns they find in juvenile murder rates, and, even here, they
don’t agree about when the rates peaked, though they agree that the rates are now on the
decrease.19
Whether or not the perception of increases in violent juvenile crime over the least two
decades is entirely accurate, it does seem that in response to this perception states have begun to
take an increasingly punitive attitude toward juvenile crime. A symbolic indication of this
punitive attitude is the change many states have made in the purpose clauses of their juvenile
codes. Forty-two states have such clauses, and virtually all had focused, as the parens patriae
doctrine would suggest, on the best interests of the offender. Since the 1980s, approximately
one-third of the states have amended their purpose clauses to include the goals of punishment,
protection of the innocent, and accountability.20 More significantly, during this period several
states have passed legislation requiring mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines for a variety
of juvenile offenses, apparently reflecting a public, or at least legislative, sense that juvenile
offenses were being punished too leniently.21 Another aspect of the trend toward greater
punitiveness of juvenile crime is the use of so-called blended sentencing in which courts have the
authority to sentence juvenile offenders to either juvenile or adult correctional facilities or both.
By contrast with the traditional juvenile system in which sentences are served in juvenile
correctional facilities and terminate no later than the age of majority, blended sentencing is more
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punitive insofar as it allows juvenile offenders to be sentenced as adults to adult facilities or it
combines juvenile correction while the offender is a juvenile with additional adult correction
once the offender reaches majority.
But the most significant element in the punitive attitude is the trend to treat juveniles as
adults. This is a more punitive trend, because, in comparison with the juvenile forum, the adult
forum makes juveniles liable to longer sentences in harsher environments and makes their
convictions a matter of permanent public record.
The most traditional mechanism for trying juveniles as adults is the judicial waiver or
transfer of the juvenile to adult criminal court. The judicial waiver occurs in a juvenile court
hearing, decided on a case-by- case basis. Model Penal Code §4.10 contemplates that the waiver
will occur only in cases in which the juvenile is at least 16 years old. It does not specify the
conditions in which such a waiver is appropriate. Traditionally, juvenile court judges have taken
into consideration the age and maturity of the accused, the prior record of the accused (e.g.
whether he is a repeat offender), and the severity or seriousness of the offense. Several states
have passed legislation that affects the judicial waiver, effectively expanding its scope. For
instance, several states have lowered the age at which the judicial waiver can be issued either as
a general matter or for certain categories of offense. For example, in 1978 New York passed a
Juvenile Offender law that made 13 year-olds eligible for trial for murder in criminal court and
made 14 year-olds eligible for such trial in cases involving lesser violent offenses. In effect, the
judicial waiver, as traditionally conceived, creates a presumption in favor of trying the accused
juvenile as a juvenile, a presumption which could only be rebutted on a case-by- case basis when
it was shown that the juvenile was sufficiently mature and had already shown signs of sufficient
incorrigibility as to justify treating him as an adult. Recently, several states have also expanded
the scope of the judicial waiver by shifting the presumption from juvenile jurisdiction to adult
jurisdiction for certain ages and categories of offense. Partly as the result of such statutory
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changes the scope of the judicial waiver has expanded considerably in recent years.22
Another mechanism of transfer to adult court involves prosecutorial discretion. Recent
legislation in several states gives prosecutors the authority, either as a general rule or in special
circumstances relating to the age of the accused and the category of offense, to determine
whether to bring the case in adult court. This mechanism allows the prosecutor to bypass the
need for a judicial hearing and waiver.

Recent legislation has simultaneously expanded

prosecutorial discretion – expanding the pool of cases in which prosecutors can exercise their
discretion to try juveniles as adults – and restricted it – by creating presumptions for transfer for
certain ages and categories of offense. Both kinds of change in prosecutorial discretion have had
the effect of increasing the number of transfers.
However, even with the legislative changes in these two transfer mechanisms, they do not
mandate transfer. Even when there is a presumption in favor of transfer, it can be rebutted in
individual cases. Perhaps the most significant and disturbing aspect of the transfer trend is the
legislative adoption in many states of mandatory transfer statutes that exclude certain cases that
would otherwise go to juvenile court from going there and require such cases to go to adult
criminal court, bypassing both judicial and prosecutorial scrutiny over the appropriate forum for
the accused. Typically, mandatory transfers lower the age at which juvenile cases go to adult
court either as a general rule or for special categories of violent offense, such as murder, rape,
and aggravated assault. The majority of states have now adopted some kind of mandatory
transfer legislation.23 For instance, adoption of Proposition 21 in 2000 added a mandatory
transfer to the California Penal Code requiring that juveniles 14 years of age or older be tried as
adults in cases where they are accused of murder or various sexual offenses, including rape,
forcible sodomy, and lewd and lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14.
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The net result of such departures from the Model Penal Code provisions for juvenile
transfer is that more juveniles are being transferred to adult court at younger ages for a broader
variety of crimes. Indeed, Nebraska is the only state that has not altered its provisions for
juvenile transfer in some way to make it easier to try juveniles as adults. It is this broad trend to
try juveniles as adults and, in particular, the trend to try ever younger juveniles as adults on
account of the seriousness of their offenses that ought to raise serious jurisprudential concerns.24

3. THE FOCUS ON PUNISHMENT
It is worth noting that there is nothing objectionable per se about the change in the
purpose clauses of state penal codes to emphasize a concern with punishment, rather than the
best interests of the offender. Though some forms of juvenile punishment may be questionable,
there should be nothing controversial about punishing juvenile crime. Nor should punishment be
contrasted with concern for the offender, protection of the innocent, or the demand for
accountability, because these are all legitimate aspects of punishment. Specifically, these three
values correspond to the three main jurisprudential rationales for punishment – rehabilitation or
correction, deterrence, and retribution.
Any assessment of the trend to try juveniles as adults must engage our assumptions about
the justification for punishment and the justification for a separate system of juvenile criminal
justice. Adequate theories of punishment should address not only whom we should punish but
also how and how much we should punish.

I cannot justify a comprehensive conception of

punishment here. What I can do is briefly explain the assumptions about the justification of
punishment that will inform my discussion and at least sketch some reasons for thinking that this
view is plausible.
24
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The rehabilitative or corrective view of punishment sees crime as the expression of antisocial behavior, perhaps itself the product of social dysfunction, and sees the goal of punishment
as the rehabilitation and resocialization of the individual into constructive and socially acceptable
behavior. It tells us that we should punish anti-social behavior and that we should do so in a
manner and to the extent necessary to resocialize the offender. This corrective view is one
traditional conception of punishment and certainly underlies much of the parens patriae doctrine
that has been influential in juvenile justice.
A consequentialist justifies punishment by appeal to its good consequences. Though
consequentialists could appeal to the value of rehabilitation, historically they have appealed to
punishment’s contribution to reducing crime and promoting peace and security. This deterrent
value has two main components.

Punishment has value as a general deterrent insofar as

punishing A for his crime tends to deter others (B-Z) from committing similar crimes. It also has
value as a specific deterrent insofar as it deters A from repeat offense.25 Consequentialism of
this sort tells us that we should punish those whose punishment would deter crime and that we
should punish in a manner and to the extent necessary to secure this deterrent effect. For
instance, Jeremy Bentham, perhaps the most famous proponent of the consequentialist
conception of punishment, claims that we should punish in ways calculated to deter crime and
that the severity of punishment should be such that it is greater than the expected profit of each
offense discounted (divided) by the perceived probability that the infraction will be punished.26
Both the corrective and consequentialist conceptions of punishment are forward-looking;
they justify punishment by its good effects, whether these are therapeutic effects for the offender
25
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or special and general deterrent effects. By contrast, the retributive view of punishment is
backward-looking; it appeals to desert. Retributive theories answer the questions about whom
we should punish and why by insisting that punishment be reserved for those who deserve
sanctions on the basis of prior wrongdoing. They answer the question of how and how much to
punish by appeal to the idea of proportionality; the magnitude of punishment for a crime should
be commensurate with the magnitude of the wrong done.27
While there are no doubt important roles for considerations of rehabilitation and
deterrence to play in an adequate theory of punishment, it is hard to believe that any purely
forward-looking theory could represent an adequate conception of punishment. The purely
forward-looking theories do not give plausible answers to the questions whom to punish and how
much to punish.
Consider the corrective view.

If rehabilitation is the exclusive or main goal of

punishment, then it looks as if our penal practices are often unjustified. Over-crowded and brutal
prisons in which insufficient resources are devoted to education and job training are schools for
social pathology, not schools for the social sentiments. No doubt there is need for penal reform,
but a huge mismatch between penal rationale and penal practice can make us rethink the
adequacy of the rationale.
Moreover, we may doubt whether rehabilitation is a good guide about whom to punish.
Many people, including those who have not broken the law, may be in need of social adjustment.
Is the state permitted to require compulsory therapy for those who have not committed crimes?
Nor is it clear that rehabilitation is a good guide as to how much to punish. Suppose we have
two people who have committed equally serious crimes for which they are equally responsible.
Should their sentences differ just because one is easier to resocialize than the other? And what
about those who cannot be rehabilitated? Do they deserve no punishment at all?
27
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the seriousness of the wrong they do without raping rapists.
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Similar worries plague the pure consequentialist theory of punishment.

The most

notorious worry is that it too provides an inadequate account of whom to punish, because it
would condone and indeed require punishing the innocent if this had sufficient deterrent value.
The stock example is that in response to a recent crime spree a sheriff may be able to prevent a
security crisis and general unrest if he frames an innocent person for the crimes.28 We might also
wonder about the consequentialist account of how much to punish. If the crime arose from
unique temptations in circumstances very unlikely to repeat themselves or the offender happened
to undergo a character change after the commission of his crime, then there might be no special
deterrent value to punishing him very much. And if the public were to understand this, there
might be little general deterrent value to punishing him. Or there might be other ways of
securing the general deterrent value if the state could reliably produce the appearance of
punishing the offender without actually punishing him. In such circumstances, there would be
little consequentialist reason to punish him or to punish him very much. But many of us would
think that he still deserves punishment and that he deserves significant punishment if he is
blameworthy for a serious crime.
To explain whom we should punish, I think we need to appeal to retributive ideas. We
should punish those who deserve punishment because they are blameworthy for wrongdoing. In
this way, notions of desert and accountability place a limiting condition on whom we may
punish.

Moreover, the retributive ideal of proportionality provides a reasonably plausible

account of how much to punish. Adapting a formula from Robert Nozick, we could understand
28
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accommodation and reform. However, I suspect that for any attempt at consequentialist
accommodation, we can reconfigure the example so that the consequentialist is forced to support
reformist conclusions. These will be worth taking seriously, but rejecting consequentialism will
remain an attractive alternative.
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the retributivist as saying that punishment (P) should be proportional to desert (D), where D
should itself be understood as the product of the magnitude of the wrong committed (W) and the
person’s degree of responsibility (R) for act in question.29 In other words,
P = D = W x R.
Any conception of retributivism must then interpret these two independent variables –
wrongdoing and responsibility.

Formally, responsibility is straightforward.

Degree of

responsibility should be measured on a 0-1 scale in which 0 indicates no responsibility and 1
indicates 100% responsibility. Who is responsible for what and to what degree will obviously
depend on the substantive details of the correct theory of responsibility. The retributivist also
needs a conception of the magnitude of wrongdoing. It is natural to think that the magnitude of
an agent’s wrongdoing will be determined in significant part by the harm he causes, but there
may be other determinants as well.30
The retributive formula is not without potential problems, but it provides a useful and
intuitive first approximation to a retributive conception of punishment and proportionality.
Whereas this formula determines the length or severity of punishment, it does not otherwise tell
us how to punish. It is here, I am inclined to think, that corrective and deterrent considerations
29
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responsibility (P = W = H x R).
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An exclusive focus on harm is problematic, because it would not allow us to justify punishment
of actions that do not result in actual harms. In some cases – for instance, in cases involving
failed criminal attempts (e.g. attempted murder), token crimes that do not harm the victim even if
the general type of crime normally does harm its victims (e.g. a murder that inadvertently ends a
life not worth living or that inadvertently prevents a much more painful murder seconds later),
and victimless crimes – this result may seem strongly counterintuitive. Victimless crimes raise
special issues and puzzles. We could perhaps deal with the first two sorts of cases by making
wrongdoing track the harm risked, intended, or normally resulting from the type of action in
question. Interesting as these issues are, I won’t pursue them further here.
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have a role to play. Provided that we punish all and only the guilty and that our punishments are
proportional to the wrongness of the crime, we should punish in ways designed to rehabilitate the
offender and deter crime.
This is a sketch of one way of trying to recognize and integrate the apparently disparate
demands of correction, deterrence, and retribution within a conception of punishment that
recognizes blameworthiness and desert as limiting conditions on whom we may punish. In the
discussion that follows, it will be useful to have some such conception of punishment in place,
though I will try, so far as possible, to be agnostic between rival ways of spelling out the details
of such a conception.

4.

IMMATURITY,

NORMATIVE

COMPETENCE,

AND

THE

RETRIBUTIVE

PERSPECTIVE
Proponents of transferring juveniles to adult criminal court appear to be moved by a level
of violence in juvenile crime normally associated with adult crime. The motto seems to be that
adult crime calls for adult penalties. But insofar as we are retributivists about whom to punish
and how much to punish, we should see a problem with the trend to try juveniles as adults on
account of the seriousness of their crimes. It is true that the retributive formula implies that all
else being equal the more pernicious the crime the greater should be the punishment. But all else
is not equal when we are comparing juvenile and adult crime. Harm done and responsibility or
culpability for harm done are independent factors in determining the wrongness of someone’s
actions.

Juveniles can cause harm as severe as adults can, but typically they bear less

responsibility for the harm they cause. This is because they tend to lack, or possess to a reduced
degree, the normative competence required for responsibility.
Responsibility is tied to notions of agency and personhood. In An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding John Locke distinguishes between persons and men (or, as we might
prefer to say, human beings) and claims that the concept of a person and that of the same person
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over time are “forensic” concepts.31

Part of what Locke means is that only persons are

accountable in law and morality, because only persons are responsible for their actions. Nonresponsible agents act on their strongest desires; if they deliberate, it is only about the
instrumental means to the satisfaction of their desires. By contrast, responsible agents must be
able to distinguish between the intensity and authority of their desires, deliberate about the value
or authority of their desires, and regulate their actions in accordance with their deliberations.
One must possess this sort of normative competence to qualify in law and morals as a
responsible agent or person. Agents who possess this normative competence but do not exercise
it properly are responsible for their wrongdoing.
Normative competence can be compromised in various ways that the law recognizes.
The insane and the severely mentally retarded lack normative competence and, as a result, are
not responsible. But normative competence is not an all or nothing matter, and there is good
reason to suppose that immaturity involves a form of reduced or diminished normative
competence. Normative competence involves the cognitive ability to discriminate right from
wrong but also the affective and conative abilities to regulate one’s emotions, appetites, and
actions in accordance with this normative knowledge.32 One central ingredient in normative

31

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [first published 1690], ed. P.H.
Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), book II, chapter xxvii, §§8, 15, 17-21, 23, 26.
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For this reason, I am inclined to resist conceptions of responsibility within the criminal law that
analyze responsibility solely in terms of cognitive or rational capacities and to insist that
responsibility requires independent affective and conative capacities. Good statements of the
cognitive conception are Herbert Fingarette and Ann Fingarette Hasse, Mental Disabilities and
Criminal Responsibility (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Michael Moore, Law
and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984) and
Placing Blame (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); and Stephen Morse, “Uncontrollable Urges and
Irrational People” Virginia Law Review 88 (2002), pp. 1025-78. A good statement of the
comprehensive conception is Peter Arenella, “Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing
the Relationship between Legal and Moral Accountability” UCLA Law Review 39 (1992), pp.
1511-1622. However, the differences between the two conceptions are harder to make out if the
cognitive conception includes various affective and conative capacities as prerequisites or
ingredients of rationality.
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competence is impulse control – the ability to refrain from acting on one’s good-independent
desires that is necessary to being guided by one’s good-dependent desires.

All of these

capacities appear to be scalar insofar as they can be possessed to different degrees. The gradual
development of this competence is what marks normal normative progress through childhood
and adolescence to maturity. Though not all individuals mature at the same rate, and some
individuals never mature, this sort of normative maturation is strongly correlated with age. The
reduced normative competence of juveniles provides a retributive justification for reduced
punishment for juveniles
Of course, it is not always easy to distinguish between a failure to exercise normative
competence and a lack of such competence or a reduced capacity. This is part of what makes the
insanity defense controversial and the notion of temporary insanity even more troublesome.33
But the sort of reduced or diminished capacity due to immaturity is in some ways less
troublesome. Insanity is an anomalous condition, afflicting a minority of people, often lacking
obvious markers. By contrast, immaturity is a normal condition, which all adults passed through.
Though there is some individual variation, it is strongly correlated with age.
There is widespread agreement among developmental psychologists that the period
between twelve and eighteen years of age is a time of very significant physical, cognitive, and
emotional development.34 Older adolescents may have many of the cognitive abilities that adults
33

This is really a problem with applying the insanity defense. A prior problem is with its
interpretation. In the post Hinckley era, state courts and legislatures have increasingly construed
the relevant sort of normative incompetence in purely cognitive terms in which the accused
counts as legally insane if and only if she lacks knowledge of right and wrong. But while such a
cognitive incompetence should be a sufficient condition of insanity, it should not be a necessary
condition. The purely cognitive interpretation of insanity ignores affective and conative aspects
of normative competence, which I distinguished above. However, this is a topic for another
paper.
34

See, generally, E. Scott, N. Reppucci, and J. Woolard, “Evaluating Adolescent Decision
Making in Legal Contexts” Law and Human Behavior 19 (1995), pp. 221-44, and Thomas
Grisso and Robert Schwartz (eds), Youth on Trial: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile
Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
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have, but they lack the wealth of experience and factual information that adults typically possess.
Even when older adolescents share cognitive abilities with adults, they typically lack familiar
forms of emotional and social maturity and control. They are less able to represent the future
adequately, with the result that they are more impulsive and less risk-averse.35 Moreover,
adolescents are also less able to represent the interests of other adequately, with the result that
their sense of empathy, which is crucial in inhibiting harmful behavior, is less strong.36 They
also tend to be more susceptible to the influence of peers, with the result that they lack a key
ingredient in autonomy.37 Finally, there is emerging evidence that the neurological correlates of
these cognitive, emotional, and social capacities are undergoing crucial development throughout
adolescence and well into late adolescence.38
If normative competence is a condition of responsibility, then the reduced or diminished
normative competence of juveniles calls into question most of the punitive reforms to juvenile
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See, e.g., P. Finn and B. Bragg, “Perception of the Risk of an Accident by Young and Older
Drivers” Accident Analysis and Prevention 18 (1986), pp. 289-98; M. Tester, W. Gardiner, and
E. Wilfong, “Experimental Studies of the Development of Decision-making Competence” in
Children, Risks, and Decisions: Psychological and Legal Implications (New York: American
Psychological Association, 1987); W. Gardner and J. Herman, “Adolescents’ AIDS Risk Taking:
A Rational Choice Perspective” in Adolescents in the AIDS Epidemic, ed. Gardiner (et. al.) (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991); and Scott, et. al., “Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in
Legal Contexts”.
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See, e.g. Martin Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2000).
37

See, e.g., T. Berndt, “Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers and Parents”
Developmental Psychology 15 (1979), pp. 608-16; S. Steinberg and S. Silverberg, “The
Vicissitudes of Autonomy in Early Adolescence” Child Development 57 (1986), pp. 841-51;
Scott et. al., “Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts”; and Youth on Trial: A
Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice, ed. Grisso and Schwartz.
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See, e.g., S. Anderson, A. Bechara, H. Damasio, D. Tranel, and A. Damasio, “Impairment of
Social and Moral Behavior Related to Damage in Human Prefontal Cortex” Nature Neuroscience
2 (1999), pp. 1032-37; F. Benes, “The Development of Prefontal Cortex: The Maturation of
Neurotransmitter Systems and their Interactions” in Fundamentals of Developmental
Neurobiology [get publication details].
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justice. I say most, because there is a retributive rationale for the selective use of blended
sentencing.

Older mature adolescents will often be significantly, if not fully, normatively

competent. So they can be largely, if not fully, responsible for committing heinous crimes.
Under the traditional juvenile sentencing rules that require juvenile sentences to expire by the
age of majority, such offenders are unlikely to receive sentences commensurate with their
wrongdoing. Indeed, there is a puzzle for the traditional juvenile sentencing system that the
older and more responsible the offender the less time is he eligible to serve for his crimes.
Blended sentencing provides a solution to this puzzle insofar as it allows mature adolescents who
are substantially culpable for serious harms to serve adult sentences in addition to limited
juvenile sentences. I am not claiming that the actual use of blended sentencing has typically
conformed to the retributive formula of proportionality, only that the retributive conception of
proportionality endorses in principle the selective use of blended sentencing.
However, even if the retributive conception of punishment may find room for selective
use of blended sentencing, it condemns the trend to transfer juveniles to adult criminal court.
The fact that juveniles tend to be less normatively competent than their adult counterparts
implies that all else being equal a juvenile is less responsible for her crime than her adult
counterpart is for the same crime and that all else being equal the younger the juvenile the less
responsible she is for her crime.39

Insofar as punishment should be proportional to the

wrongness of a criminal act and wrongness is itself the product of the act’s harm and the agent’s
responsibility for the act, the diminished competence of juveniles provides a retributive rationale
for reduced punishment for juveniles. But this means that the appeal to accountability that is

39

Insofar as juvenile crime is the product of various mental disorders that impair normative
competence, this is further reason for reducing or (in extreme cases) eliminating punishment.
See, e.g., Alan Kazadin, “Adolescent Development, Mental Disorders, and Decision Making of
Delinquent Youths” in Youth on Trial: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice, ed.
Grisso and Schwartz. But this is really a separate issue. Similar claims might be made about the
role of mental disorders in adult criminal activity. I’m here interested in the question whether
adolescence, as such, justifies diminished responsibility.
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often made to support the trend to try juveniles as adults, so far from supporting that trend,
actually undermines it.

5. IMMATURITY, REHABILITATION, AND DETERRENCE
We have seen that immaturity is directly relevant to the retributivist’s backward-looking
rationale for punishment. It is also directly relevant to the forward-looking rationales involving
rehabilitation and deterrence.
Rehabilitative goals have a legitimate role in adult criminal justice, in which offenders
are fully responsible for their crimes. They have an even more important role in juvenile
criminal justice, in which the immaturity of offenders renders them simultaneously less
responsible but more corrigible. Adolescence is a pivotal period both because it is a time of
enormous cognitive and emotional growth and maturation and because it is time when enduring
intellectual, emotional, and social habits are being established. This means that adoption of the
rehabilitative stance toward juvenile offenders is not only especially appropriate but also
especially consequential. This makes it imperative that juvenile offenders be sentenced to
special juvenile facilities that avoid the brutality of adult prisons, that provide significant
educational, vocational, and avocational training, and that make provisions for the special
nutritional and developmental needs of adolescents. Adult correctional facilities rarely address
rehabilitative goals with adult offenders. They are even more poorly suited to address the special
rehabilitative needs and opportunities posed by juvenile offenders. But then the trend to try
juveniles as adults and incarcerate them in adult correctional facilities runs afoul of rehabilitative
ideals of punishment.
We can also see how immaturity changes the operation of deterrent values within
juvenile criminal justice. Rehabilitation itself can have deterrent value, because successful
rehabilitation results in specific deterrence. But, of course, deterrence is usually understood in
terms of sanctions. By attaching sanctions to criminal activity, we make it less attractive; the
greater the sanctions we attach to it, the more unattractive we make such activity.

But the
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deterrent effect of sanctions crucially depends on potential criminals being rational calculators of
expected utility. But immaturity compromises this assumption. Adolescents are not rational
calculators of utility. Not only do they lack the cognitive capacities of adults, but also, and more
importantly, they lack the ability to vividly represent the future and are prone to discount the
significance of future benefits and harms out of proportion to their actual magnitude. But this
means that sanctions that might, in principle, work for adults just won’t have the same deterrent
value for juveniles.40 In fact, there is evidence from Florida and other states that use of harsher,
adult criminal sanctions for minors actually increases recidivism rates.41 If so, considerations of
specific deterrence actually speak against the transfer trend. In the juvenile context, deterrence is
more likely to be served by establishing better schools for the social sentiments both inside and
outside of correctional facilities than by ratcheting up the severity of the sanctions for violating
the law.

6. TWO TRACKS IN JUVENILE CRIME
A further consideration potentially relevant to both forward-looking rationales for
punishment, viz. rehabilitation and deterrence, is that there is growing evidence that for many
children adolescence involves a period of increased risk-taking and anti-social impulses that is
normally outgrown.

The historically robust fact that juvenile crime constitutes a

disproportionate amount of all crime committed means that most deviance is limited to
adolescence. Most deviant adolescents do not become deviant adults. Whereas most teenage
offenders do not become career criminals, younger pre-teen arrest is the best predictor of career
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(a) Of course, adults will also fail to be rational utility maximizers insofar as they are temporal
discounters. My present point is simply that adolescents tend to be more subject to temporal bias
than adults. (b) I am not even factoring in the live possibility that flouting social norms and
sanctions might actually be an incentive for many adolescents.
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Donna Bishop et. al., “The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Does it Make a
Difference?” Crime and Delinquency 42 (1996), pp. 171-91.
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criminality.

This suggests that the class of juvenile offenders divides roughly into two

subclasses – a small number of juveniles whose anti-social tendencies begin before puberty who
are strongly disposed to become career offenders and a much larger number of juveniles whose
deviance is confined to adolescence and who, under normal circumstances, would outgrow these
deviant tendencies. Whereas specifically adolescent deviance is more common and represents a
temporary phase, preteen deviance is strongly correlated with cognitive and emotional
disabilities and the presence of domestic dysfunction and other environmental stress for which it
is very difficult to correct.42 This two-track model of juvenile deviance suggests that a two- track
approach to juvenile crime is worth exploring.

The alternative approach stresses intervention,

which can sometimes be punitive, but it does not endorse the trend toward greater punitiveness
or the trend toward trying juveniles as adults.
Specifically adolescent offenders with no prior history of preteen deviance should be held
accountable for their offenses, and indeed being held accountable for their actions is an essential
ingredient in the normal process of normative maturation. But their diminished normative
competence means that all else being equal they are less accountable for the harm they cause
than their adult counterparts and that, as a result, they deserve to be punished proportionately less
severely. Their immaturity and corrigibility suggests that deterrence will not be served by a
more punitive response and that there are greater opportunities for rehabilitation with juvenile
offenders than with their adult counterparts. The fact that specifically adolescent offenders tend
to outgrow their deviance provides further reason to think that neither rehabilitative nor deterrent
goals will be served by adopting a more punitive attitude toward these offenders.
The two-track model of juvenile deviance suggests that preteen offenses should be
handled quite differently. There is little retributive rationale for punishment. Few think that
42

See, e.g., Terrie Moffitt, “Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial
Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy” Psychological Review 100 (1993), pp. 674-701 and
Thomas Grisso, “Society’s Retributive Response to Juvenile Violence: A Developmental
Perspective” Law and Human Behavior 20 (1996), pp. 229-47.
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normal preteens – those that suffer from no special cognitive, affective, or conative deficits – are
fully responsible, and the trend to try juveniles as adults only rarely extends to preteens. If
preteen crime is mostly committed by children that do suffer from such deficits, then there is
even less reason to treat them as normatively competent and even less reason to treat them as
responsible for the harm they cause. The absence of responsibility for their offenses means that
they do not meet the retributive condition for punishment. But other forms of intervention and
civil commitment may be appropriate. If preteen offenders, especially those who are near
adolescence, suffer deficits in their normative competence that strongly dispose them to careers
of social deviance, then considerations of specific deterrence give us special reason to be
concerned about them. Insofar as they remain corrigible, there is special reason to try to achieve
specific deterrence through rehabilitation. Insofar as the normative deficits are incorrigible,
specific deterrence may only be achievable through various forms of detention or monitoring.
A two-track approach to juvenile justice raises a host of interesting and important moral
questions that cannot be pursued here. Moreover, we won’t be able to get very far in addressing
them without better empirical models of the causes and corrigibility of preteen deviance. For
present purposes, the important point is that whether such a two-track approach to juvenile
justice is appropriate and, if so, how it is best developed, it does not support a more punitive
attitude toward juvenile crime or, specifically, the transfer trend.

7. IMMATURITY AND TRANSFER
When we consider various familiar and empirically well documented facts about the
normative immaturity of adolescents in light of the retributive, corrective, and deterrent values
underlying criminal jurisprudence, we can see a clear rationale for a separate system of juvenile
justice. Immaturity may also raise special problems for juvenile competence to stand trial, in
particular, to understand the charges, to assist counsel in preparing a defense, and to make plea
decisions. A different set of procedural rules that creates a less adversarial culture may be
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necessary in order to ensure due process requirements for juveniles.43 But our focus has been on
the way that immaturity affects responsibility and considerations about punishment. In these
matters, immaturity provides a rationale for something like traditional arrangements that provide
for less punitive responses to juvenile crime than for comparable adult crime. Their comparative
immaturity makes juveniles less responsible for their crimes than their adult counterparts; it
makes them more amenable to rehabilitation; and it renders sanctions a less effective deterrent.
These are strong presumptive reasons to treat juvenile crime within juvenile court and to regard
the transfer trend, especially the trend toward mandatory transfer, as jurisprudentially troubling.
The Model Penal Code’s provisions for immaturity and limited judicial waiver (§4.10) are
consistent with this rationale. The trend to make the transfer of juveniles to adult criminal court
easier and to make it applicable to ever younger juveniles for an ever wider range of offenses is
not consistent with this rationale.
Does this appeal to immaturity overlook resources for defending the transfer trend? I
consider three strategies.

The transfer trend typically focuses on violent crime.

We

considered the rationale for transfer that claims that adult crimes require adult penalties. We
faulted that rationale for failing to distinguish between harm and culpability as two independent
factors contributing to the wrongness of a crime. We argued that even if juveniles cause the
same harm as their adult counterparts, they are less culpable, because less responsible, because
less normatively competent. But the proponent of the transfer trend might protest that it is a
mistake to insist that harm and culpability are always independent factors. In the case of violent
crime, it might be claimed, the seriousness of the harm makes it harder for the offender to plead
normative incompetence. The idea is that the more harmful the crime is the easier it is to
recognize that it is wrong. Adolescents may experience difficulties appreciating the difference
between simple and gross negligence, but they should have no difficulty determining that murder
is wrong. If so, the immaturity excuse, while otherwise applicable, may not apply to violent
43

See, e.g., the discussion in Youth on Trial, ed. Grisso and Schwartz, part II.
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juvenile crime.
We might wonder whether the wrongfulness of causing harm is always directly
proportional to the magnitude of the harm. Some forms of cheating and lying are obviously
wrong, even when they cause little or no harm, and some actions that cause real suffering, even
death, are not obviously wrong. But there is a further worry about this defense of the transfer
trend. For even if more violent crimes were more obviously wrong, that wouldn’t show that
immaturity didn’t threaten responsibility. For normative competence is not a simple cognitive
ability. The normatively competent person not only has to be able to tell right from wrong but
also has to be able to regulate her emotions, appetites, and actions in accord with her normative
knowledge.

But this, we noted, requires significant imaginative, affective, and conative

capacities, including a capacity for impulse control, a capacity to project oneself into the future, a
capacity to empathize with others, and a capacity for independent judgment and action. So even
if adolescents had the requisite moral knowledge, it would not follow that they had the requisite
strengths of will required for normative competence.
The first defense of the transfer trend focuses on crimes whose turpitude seems especially
salient. A different defense focuses on crimes that may seem to have maturity built into them.
Among the most serious crimes that the transfer trend targets are those involving premeditation.
But premeditated crime seems to be the antithesis of impulsive behavior.

Elaborate and

temporally extended planning of a crime suggests that the offender has control of her actions.
This would suggest that those guilty of premeditated crimes would be more responsible for their
crimes, and this might suggest that the defense of immaturity, which might be appropriate for
crimes of impulse or passion, has less application for crimes of premeditation.
Even if premeditation implied normative competence, this would not provide a defense of
the transfer trend, if only because the transfer trend is much broader, applying to various serious
harmings that don’t involve significant premeditation. The transfer trend targets crimes of
passion and impulse, as well as crimes of premeditation. Indeed, as Lionel Tate’s case suggests,
even first degree murder need not involve elaborate and extended planning. So there is much
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juvenile crime that is treated, under the transfer trend, as adult crime that does not involve the
sort of significant premeditation that might seem incompatible with immaturity. Even more
importantly, it is a mistake to think that premeditation is a reliable sign of normative
competence. Impulse resistability may be a necessary condition of normative competence, and
premeditation may demonstrate one form of impulse resistability, but that doesn’t make
premeditation a sufficient condition of normative competence. In particular, it is possible to
engage in means-ends reasoning in the formation of plans and to display resoluteness in the
execution of such plans without being suitably competent to deliberate about one’s ends and to
put one’s emotions and desires in proper perspective.

Children often engage in elaborate

planning in the service of whims or other ends for which they are not accountable. A version of
this can be found among adolescents as well. They may commit crimes that reflect elaborate and
temporally extended planning, but they may nonetheless be unable to appreciate fully the
normative significance of the ends for the sake of which they have planned. Their ends may
reflect steep temporal discounting of long-term benefits and harms, an inadequate ability to
empathize with the interests of others whom their actions affect, or an exaggerated concern with
approval of their peers expressed in the inflation of petty jealousies, resentments, and rivalries.
Such failings correspond to different dimensions of normative competence – capacities for
temporal neutrality, empathy, and autonomy. Because premeditation does not guarantee these
other aspects of normative competence and these aspects of normative competence tend to be
immature and developing in juveniles, premeditation does not rebut the case for reduced juvenile
culpability.
The proponent of the transfer trend might appeal instead to the scalar nature of normative
competence and individual variability in normative maturation. She could then argue that some
individuals are normatively more mature than their chronological peers and that some juveniles
are as mature or even more mature than some adults. This would justify punishing them as
adults, as the transfer trend requires.
The premises of this argument are plausible, but the conclusion does not follow. First of
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all, the law often draws lines in ways that generally but nonetheless imperfectly track the facts
that matter. Setting the boundary between juveniles and adults at 18 years of age, as the Model
Penal Code does, is probably a case in point. Even if the boundary is supposed to track
normative maturation, some 17 year-olds may be more normatively mature than some 19 yearolds.

That doesn’t make the 18 year-old boundary arbitrary.

We can try to achieve

individualized justice, consistent with the use of a generally but imperfectly reliable boundary
marker, if we allow the marker to establish a rebuttable presumption. Here, the relevant court
would consider and assess rebuttals on a case-by- case basis. Normatively immature young adult
defendants could try to establish their immaturity in adult court, and prosecutors could try to
establish normative precocity in mature juvenile defendants in juvenile court. This is what §4.10
of the Model Penal Code already recognizes: 16 and 17 year-olds can be transferred to adult
court after a judicial hearing in juvenile court in which the judge determines that the juvenile in
question is sufficiently mature and incorrigible. But the transfer trend outstrips these Model
Penal Code provisions. That trend pushes the age at which normative competence might be
established much further back, to ages where it strains credulity to think that the case for
normative immaturity could be successfully rebutted. This is bad enough, but an important
strand in the transfer trend actually inverts the presumption so that many juveniles accused of
certain crimes now bear the presumption of showing that they should be tried in juvenile court.
Worse still are the mandatory transfer laws, such as California’s Proposition 21, that
automatically transfer comparatively young juveniles accused of certain crimes to adult court. It
is hard to see how such transfer policies could be defended by appeal to the scalar nature of
normative competence and individual variability in normative maturation. An unrebuttable 18
year-old cut-off, which no one endorses, would be bad, but at least it would generally if
imperfectly track the facts about normative competence that matter. To replace an imaginary
unrebuttable 18 year-old cut-off in favor of an unrebuttable 14 year-old cut-off is ludicrous. It
too fails to achieve individualized justice, but it also greatly multiplies the number of individual
injustices. For while an 18 year-old test for adulthood will be both under-inclusive and over-
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inclusive at the margins, a 14 year-old test will be massively over-inclusive. This is bad enough.
If we assume, as most do, that it is better to weight the criminal justice system so that errors of
over-punishment are seen as worse than errors of under-punishment, then the transfer trend must
seem especially unjust.44

8. SEPARATE OR UNIFIED TREATMENT FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE?
The transfer trend is a modification to or adjustment within a dual system of criminal
justice that makes parallel but different provisions for adult and juvenile offenders. So its reform
of juvenile justice is selective. The transfer trend retains this dual system but seeks to reduce the
number of individuals processed in the juvenile system and increase the number of individuals
processed in the adult system. The trend is to treat some significant number of offenders that had
been processed as juveniles exactly as if they were adults. I have argued that this is a reform in
the dual system that we should resist. But it is worth considering a proposal for what appears to
be more radical reform in our dual system of criminal justice.
This more radical reform seeks to abolish a separate system for juvenile justice
altogether. This proposal will be unjust if it treats juveniles exactly as it treats as adults. But it
need not.

For instance, in his book Bad Kids Barry Feld acknowledges the rationale for

punishing juveniles less severely than their adult counterparts that appeals to diminished
normative competence and reduced responsibility, but he questions why we need to
accommodate this fact within dual systems of criminal justice.45 Instead, he advocates a unified
system of juvenile justice, modeled on our current (adult) criminal justice system, that allows
immaturity to function as a mitigating factor at sentencing.
44

This weighting is reflected in the fact that the criminal law employs the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, which reflects the attitude that it worse to convict the innocent than
to let the guilty go free.
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Barry Feld, Bad Kids: Race and the Transformation of the Juvenile Court (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999), esp. ch. 8.
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While this proposal would address the retributive reasons for punishing juveniles less, it
would not yet address the deterrence reasons for punishing specifically adolescent offenses less
(on the ground that deviance is a condition that most such offenders will naturally outgrow) or
the rehabilitation reasons for punishing juvenile offenses differently (on the ground that juvenile
offenders are more corrigible than their adult counterparts).

But Feld is prepared to

accommodate these considerations as well. He seems to think that where the offense is part of
adolescence-specific deviance youth can play a further mitigating role.46 Also, he proposes that
criminal courts distinguish between the appropriate degree and manner of criminal liability. On
his proposal, criminal courts would determine what sort of correctional facilities offenders attend
and what sort of services and opportunities should be open to them.47 Juveniles could and should
be assigned to juvenile-specific correctional facilities that provided different nutritional and
educational services than adult facilities.
Though this proposal to abolish the juvenile court is in one way more radical than the
transfer trend which accepts the juvenile court but seeks to limit its role, its reforms are very
different from the transfer trend.

For the abolitionist reform preserves the traditionalist’s

insistence that all else being equal juveniles are less culpable for the harm they cause than their
adult counterparts and so are deserving of less punishment, whereas the transfer trend rejects this
commitment to differential desert and punishment. From this perspective, the transfer reforms
are much more radical than the abolitionist reforms. Because the abolitionist reforms do not
threaten differential desert and punishment, I see them as much less threatening to the traditional
rationale for a separate juvenile court. Whether a unified system would be preferable to a
separate juvenile court raises many issues worth discussing but that are beyond the scope of this
essay. I will briefly mention just a few.
Perhaps unitary systems of criminal justice enjoy both theoretical and administrative
46

Ibid., p. 325.
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32

simplicity. But we have just seen that Feld is sensitive to the need for establishing separate
correctional facilities for youthful and adult offenders.

Separate correctional facilities are

compatible with unified courts, but once we allow dual or parallel institutions into the criminal
justice process at one point, we must give up on the goal of complete integration or unification,
and it is less clear what the appeal of partial integration or unification is.
More importantly, separate juvenile courts may function as useful institutional antidotes
to case-by- case analysis of both youthful and adult offenders in a single criminal court. For there
is some reason to think that many people do not distinguish adequately between causing harm
and being morally responsible for harm or that they do not attach sufficient weight to mitigating
factors such as diminished competence and responsibility. Indeed, if my arguments are right,
this sort moral blindspot is precisely what underlies the transfer trend. Further evidence for such
a blindspot is found in a study that gauges societal consensus on capital punishment for
juveniles. A survey of recent jurors found that the heinousness of the crime was the main
determinant of jurors’ willingness to impose the death penalty and that willingness to do so was
not terribly sensitive to the age or maturity of the defendant.48 A natural worry is that this
48

See C. Crosby, P. Britner, K Jodl, and S. Portwood, “The Juvenile Death Penalty and the
Eighth Amendment: An Empirical Investigation of Societal Consensus and Proportionality” Law
and Human Behavior 19 (1995), pp.245-61. The questionnaire contained descriptions of cases
with defendants on trial for murder whose ages ranged from 10-19 years old. The details of the
cases included a description of the crime, probable culpability of all juveniles, level of remorse,
and age of the defendant. The number of respondents willing to impose the death penalty for
defendants were as follows: 96.3% of male respondents and 95.7% of female respondents were
willing to impose the death penalty on the 19 year old defendant; 92% of male respondents and
87% of female respondents were willing to impose the death penalty on the 16 year old
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insensitive to immaturity, and the willingness among female respondents was more sensitive, the
level of insensitivity in both men and women was striking. A similar finding about the
comparative insensitivity of views about the severity of sentencing to degree of maturity and
normative competence is made in S. Ghetti and A. Redlich, “Reactions to Youth Crime:
Perceptions of Accountability and Competency” Behavioral Sciences and the Law 19 (2001), pp.
33-52.
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blindspot about the effect of immaturity on culpability and of culpability on desert will have full
range to operate in case-by-case treatment of juvenile offenders within a unified criminal court
with the predictable result that juveniles will be treated like their adult counterparts more often
than they deserve. Use of a separate juvenile court might be defended as a sort of institutional
precommitment strategy to block the bias in assignment of just deserts that would result from the
operation of the blindspot in a unified system.
Feld’s abolitionist proposal contains its own precommitment strategy that might deal with
this blindspot, even if it wasn’t designed for this purpose. Feld’s proposal gives up case-by- case
evaluation of juvenile offenders. Though he recognizes that the morally relevant variable is
maturity, he proposes to treat age as an objective and administratively feasible proxy for maturity
and to use age as the basis for a discount rate that is to be applied to the sentencing of juvenile
offenders.
This categorical approach would take the form of an explicit “youth discount” at
sentencing. A fourteen-year-old offender might receive, for example, 25 to 33 percent of
the adult penalty; a 16-year-old defendant, 50 to 60 percent; and an eighteen-year-old, the
full penalty, as is presently the case. The “deeper discounts” for younger offenders
correspond to the developmental continuum and their more limited opportunities to learn
self-control and to exercise responsibility. A youth discount based on reduced culpability
functions as a sliding scale of diminished responsibility.49
Because Feld’s youth discount rate is tied to age, it represents, as he notes, a categorical
approach to juvenile sentencing that would precommit judges and prevent the operation of the
blindspot in case-by-case evaluation within an integrated criminal justice system.
The youth discount rate might be an attractive precommitment strategy and it might enjoy
other pragmatic advantages. However, it sacrifices the ideal of individualized justice. For, as we
have noted (§7), age is an imperfect proxy for maturity. Even if maturation is reasonably
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regular, so that there is a significant correlation between age and maturity, there will be
individual variance. Some 16 year olds will have as much normative competence as the normal
18 year old, and some 16 year olds will have as much normative competence as the normal 14
year old. So adoption of Feld’s categorical age-based discount will be both under-punitive and
over-punitive, relative to the demands of individualized justice.
Perhaps this is just the inevitable moral trade-off that has to be made between the
demands of individualized justice and the need to correct for an over-punitive blindspot that
operates in case-by- case analysis. But some version of the traditional separate juvenile court
promises to precommit in a way that avoids the blindspot. For, in contrast with the unified
system, it takes juvenile crime out of direct comparison with adult crime and thus circumvents
the operation of the blindspot for the effects of immaturity on culpability and of culpability on
desert. In doing so, it does impose one category, viz. the distinction between minors and adults.
But, as we have seen (§§2, 7), it treats this categorical distinction as creating a defeasible
presumption. The availability of the judicial waiver allows judges to transfer a mature juvenile
to criminal court on a showing in the individual case that the defendant is sufficiently mature to
stand trial as an adult. Moreover, within juvenile court, judges can and do take account of the
maturity levels of juveniles of different ages as mitigating factors at the sentencing phase.
Both the traditional juvenile court and the proposal to abolish the juvenile court in favor
of a unified system employing a youth discount condemn the current punitive reforms embodied
in the juvenile transfer trend. Though there is a surprising amount to be said in favor the
abolitionist proposal, the traditional separate juvenile court has the advantage of making
punishment sensitive to maturity in a way that does not sacrifice individualized justice.50
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Perhaps the abolitionist who favors the age-based discount schedule could try to accommodate
the demands of individualized justice by treating that schedule as establishing rebuttable
presumptions about sentencing. It is an empirical question whether making the presumptions
rebuttable in a unified system that allows direct comparison with adult offenders would give too
much room for the blindspot to operate.
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9. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Interestingly, the transfer trend appears to be out of step with popular opinion in one way.
Recent surveys indicate that there is support for treating youthful offenders as juveniles and for
sentencing that is rehabilitative in nature.51 But public attitudes are ambivalent, inasmuch as the
transfer trend is part the political rhetoric and policy about getting tough on crime that seems to
find a responsive chord in the electorate and insofar as there is also evidence suggesting that
many people have a blindspot for the effects of maturity on culpability and of culpability on
desert. Indeed, legislative attitudes themselves appear ambivalent insofar as the transfer trend,
which effectively lowers the age of criminal responsibility, has evolved at approximately the
same time as state legislatures have acted to raise the legal drinking age to 21. It is hard to
believe that a 20 year-old is too immature to handle drinking alcohol responsibly while a 12
year-old is mature enough to stand trial for murder in criminal court and be sentenced to life
imprisonment.52 We need to bring consistency to our views about adolescents. The trend to try
juveniles as adults is inconsistent with retributive, rehabilitative, and deterrent rationales for
punishment and with the related rationales for having a separate system of juvenile justice in the
first place. A sound criminal jurisprudence requires that we stop treating juvenile offenders as
little adults.
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Actually, social and legislative ambivalence about where to drawn the line between
adolescence and adulthood is even more rampant. One can be tried as an adult for murder in
some states at age 12; one can begin to drive at age 16 or younger in most states; one can attend
R-rated movies without an adult chaperone at age 17; one can vote at age 18; and one can buy
and consume alcohol at age 21.

